文章基本信息

标题：Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products
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作者：Bureau, Jean-Christophe ; Gozlan, Estelle ; Marette, Stephan 等
期刊名称：Journal of Agribusiness
印刷版ISSN：0738-8950
出版年度：2001
期号：suppl
出版社：Journal of Agribusiness
摘要：Focusing on the issue of food safety, we consider a framework of repeated purchases under the scenario of imperfect information on product quality (adverse selection and experience goods). A firm in a northern country can more easily detect tainted products than can a southern one. When imports are banned, the northern firm does not always signal the actual quality of its products. Competition from imports may lead the northern firm to test the quality of its products as a way to differentiate itself from foreign competitors. Consumers benefit from the disclosure of information on quality, even though borders are open to products of uncertain quality. However, competition from imports also increases the cost of signaling high quality. This can be detrimental to the welfare of the importing country when the cost of detection is high.
关键词：adverse selection;north-south trade;signaling;trade