文章基本信息

标题：Using Both Sociological and Economic Incentives to Reduce Moral Hazard
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作者：Richter, Francisca G.-C. ; Diaz, Edgar F. Pebe ; Brorsen, B. Wade 等
期刊名称：Journal of Agribusiness
印刷版ISSN：0738-8950
出版年度：2003
页码：364-373
出版社：Journal of Agribusiness
摘要：Economists tend to focus on monetary incentives. In the model developed here, both sociological and economic incentives are used to diminish the apparent moral hazard problem existing in commodity grading. Training that promotes graders' response to sociological incentives is shown to increase expected benefits. The model suggests this training be increased up to the point where the marginal benefit due to training equals its marginal cost. It may be more economical to influence the grader's behavior by creating cognitive dissonance through training and rules rather than by using economic incentives alone.
关键词：grading;incentives;moral hazard;norms;social sanctions