文章基本信息

标题：Making a market for Miscanthus: Can new contract designs solve the biofuel investment hold-up problem?
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作者：Wu, Steven Y. ; Rosch, Stephanie D. ; Alexander, Corinne E. 等
期刊名称：Journal of Agribusiness
印刷版ISSN：0738-8950
出版年度：2010
期号：Suppl
出版社：Journal of Agribusiness
摘要：We present designs for optimal contracts to solve the investment hold-up problem for perennial crops for the biofuel industry. A fixed-price contract is ex-ante efficient but renegotiation-proof for a limited range of discount parameters. A perfectly- indexed contract is both renegotiation-proof and ex-post efficient. Provided long-run land prices are stationary, the expected cost for both contracts converges to the long-run expected price of land for a risk-neutral farmer.
关键词：Biofuels;Miscanthus;contract theory;industrial organization;renegotiation-proof contract