文章基本信息

标题：Ordering effects and strategic response in discrete choice experiments
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作者：Scheufele, Gabriela ; Bennett, Jeffrey W.
期刊名称：Journal of Agribusiness
印刷版ISSN：0738-8950
出版年度：2010
出版社：Journal of Agribusiness
摘要：This study explores ordering effects and response strategies in repeated binary discrete choice experiments (DCE). Mechanism design theory and empirical evidence suggest that repeated choice tasks per respondent introduce strategic behavior. We find evidence that the order in which choice sets are presented to respondents may provide strategic opportunities that affect choice decisions (‘strategic response’). The findings propose that the ‘strategic response’ does not follow strong cost-minimization but other strategies such as weak cost-minimization or good deal/ bad deal heuristics. Evidence further suggests that participants, as they answer more choice questions, not only make more accurate choices (‘institutional learning’) but may also become increasingly aware of and learn to take advantage of the order in which choice sets are presented to them (‘strategic learning’).
关键词：discrete choice experiments;incentive compatibility;mixed logit models;ordering effects;repeated binary choice task;response strategies