文章基本信息

标题：The Effective Use of Limited Information: Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Cost in Asymmetric Auctions?
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作者：Hellerstein, Daniel ; Higgins, Nathaniel
期刊名称：Journal of Agribusiness
印刷版ISSN：0738-8950
出版年度：2010
页码：288-304
出版社：Journal of Agribusiness
摘要：Conservation programs faced with limited budgets often use a competitive enrollment mechanism. Goals of enrollment might include minimizing program expenditures, encouraging broad participation, and inducing adoption of enhanced environmental practices. We use experimental methods to evaluate an auction mechanism that incorporates bid maximums and quality adjustments. We examine this mechanism’s performance characteristics when opportunity costs are heterogeneous across potential participants, and when costs are only approximately known by the purchaser. We find that overly stringent maximums can increase overall expenditures, and that when quality of offers is important, substantial increases in offer maximums can yield a better quality-adjusted result.
关键词：conservation auctions;Conservation Reserve Program;CRP;bid caps;experimental economics