文章基本信息

标题：Understanding the AMT, and Its Unadopted Sibling, the AMxT
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作者：Hines, James R. ; Logue, Kyle D.
期刊名称：Journal of Legal Analysis
印刷版ISSN：2161-7201
电子版ISSN：1946-5319
出版年度：2014
卷号：6
期号：2
页码：367-408
DOI：10.1093/jla/lau005
出版社：Oxford University Press
摘要：Four million Americans with extensive tax preferences are subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). By taxing a broad definition of income, the AMT makes it possible to have a tax system that both encourages certain activities with generous tax preferences and maintains a semblance of distributional equity. The same rationale supports the imposition of an Alternative Maximum Tax (AMxT), which would cap tax liabilities of individuals with very few preference items and thereby afford Congress greater flexibility in designing the income tax. The original 1969 AMT proposal included an AMxT; it is difficult to justify imposing one without the other.