文章基本信息

标题：Procurement with Unenforceable Contract Time and the Law of Liquidated Damages
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作者：Dosi, Cesare ; Moretto, Michele
期刊名称：Journal of Agribusiness
印刷版ISSN：0738-8950
出版年度：2012
出版社：Journal of Agribusiness
摘要：Time overruns are common in public works and are not confined to inherently complex tasks. One explanation advanced in this paper is that bidders can undergo unpredictable changes in production costs which generate an option value of waiting. By exploiting the real-option approach, we examine how the inability to force sellers to meet the contract time influences their bidding behaviour, and how this can ultimately affect the parties’ expected payoffs. Further, we examine the outcome of the bidding process when legal rules prevent the promisee from contracting for damage measures which would grant more than her lost expectation. We show that when the pre-agreed compensatory payments prove insufficient to discourage delayed orders, setting a liquidated damages clause would not lead to a Pareto superior outcome with respect to the no-damage-for delay condition. While such a clause would increase the seller’s expected payoff, the buyer’s expected payoff is lower than when the contract does not provide for any compensation for late-delivery.
关键词：Public Procurement;Fixed-Price Contracts;Cost Uncertainty;Time Overruns;Liquidated Damages;Real Options