文章基本信息

标题：Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
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作者：Chand, A.K.S. ; Currarini, Sergio ; Ursino, Giovanni 等
期刊名称：Journal of Agribusiness
印刷版ISSN：0738-8950
出版年度：2013
出版社：Journal of Agribusiness
摘要：We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium behavior, making it easier to sustain truth-telling.
关键词：Cheap Talk;Multiple Senders;Correlation