文章基本信息

标题：The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts
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作者：Lund, Andrew C. W. ; Polsky, Gregg D.
期刊名称：Notre Dame Law Review
印刷版ISSN：0745-3515
出版年度：2013
卷号：87
期号：2
页码：677
出版社：Notre Dame Law School
摘要：The article discusses the issue of diminished pay in executive compensation. It put forwards an analysis of traditional agency-cost case favoring incentive pay. It explains the attempts to improve decisions associated with financial firms. It states that it focuses on the compensation arrangements of senior executives like chief executive officers (CEOs) and considers the agency-cost-reducing mechanisms in corporate governance to be complementary.
关键词：Executive compensation -- Law & legislation; Business enterprises; Executives; Chief executive officers; Corporate governance; Agency costs