文章基本信息

标题：Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard
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作者：Ben-Shahar, Omri ; Logue, Kyle D.
期刊名称：Michigan Law Review
印刷版ISSN：0026-2234
出版年度：2012
卷号：111
期号：2
页码：197-248
出版社：University of Michigan Law School
摘要：This Article explores the potential value of insurance as a substitute for government regulation of safety. Successful regulation of behavior requires information in setting standards, licensing conduct, verifying outcomes, and assessing remedies. In various areas, the private insurance sector has technological advantages in collecting and administering the information relevant to setting standards and could outperform the government in creating incentives for optimal behavior. We explore several areas that are regulated more by private insurance than by government. In those areas, the role of the law diminishes to the administration of simple rules of absolute liability or no liability, and affected parties turn to insurers for both risk coverage and safety instructions. This Article examines the methods used in regulation-through-insurance, and then explores the potential regulatory role of insurance in additional, yet unutilized, areas: (1) consumer protection, (2)food safety and (3)financial statements.
关键词：Moral hazards; Safety; Regulation; Insurance; Behavior; Incentives; Liability; Risk; Safety standards; Information