摘要:It is common practice for public universities to impose durational residency requirements on students for tuition purposes. Of course, out-of-state students complain about the practice, which usually involves higher tuition rates for at least their first year of study, but interestingly, very few scholars have directly addressed the constitutional implications of durational residency requirements in the tuition context. There is no surprise in that, however. An intellectually honest analysis of the practice reveals some real questions about its constitutionality, but the academic community relies upon the economic benefits of the practice, at least in part, to maintain fiscal integrity. Self-interest is a powerful restraint. Naturally, a number of law students have challenged the practice by writing notes or articles in other law reviews, but it seems that their conclusions have not been taken seriously, as nothing has changed. Nor is there much case law challenging durational residency requirements for tuition purposes; university students (and their parents) seem to have accepted the practice as the norm, and cases brought by those who have challenged it are often decided based on a very narrow set of facts (and thus are limited to those facts). Though courts have dealt with durational residency requirements in many contexts, often finding them unconstitutional, they have refused to extend their holdings to the tuition context, and the United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue. However, since the Court's decision in Saenz v. Roe, the constitutionality of durational residency requirements in any context, including for tuition purposes, has become even more suspect. If ever there was a time to challenge the practice, it is now. The most effective strike would be made by a "perfect" plaintiffan unquestionably bona fide resident of a state-against a public university of a state that maintains an extremely strict policy of residency classification denying the plaintiff the benefit of in-state tuition because of an irrebuttable presumption of nonresident status. Were such an attack to be decided on purely legal grounds, the perfect plaintiff would almost certainly be victorious. Indeed, there are few, if any, legal doctrines or justifications that allow a state to classify its citizens differently for different purposes. Constitutional law also prohibits a state from creating a barrier to a United States citizen's right to travel or from violating a citizen's due process rights by irrebuttably presuming his nonresident status. Nevertheless, practical and political considerations probably preclude a