文章基本信息

标题：You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment
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作者：Bryan, Gharad ; Karlan, Dean S. ; Zinman, Jonathan 等
期刊名称：Journal of Food Distribution Research
印刷版ISSN：0047-245X
出版年度：2012
出版社：Food Distribution Research Society
摘要：We examine a randomized trial that allows separate identification of peer screening and enforcement of credit contracts. A South African microlender offered half its clients a bonus for referring a friend who repaid a loan. For the remaining clients, the bonus was conditional on loan approval. After approval, the repayment incentive was removed from half the referrers in the first group and added for half those in the second. We find large enforcement effects, a $12 (100 Rand) incentive reduced default by 10 percentage points from a base of 20%. In contrast, we find no evidence of screening.
关键词：Information asymmetries;credit market failures;peer networks;social capital;social networks