文章基本信息

标题：Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages
本地全文：下载
作者：Lee, Myoungki ; Wu, Steven Y. ; Fan, Maoyong 等
期刊名称：Journal of Food Distribution Research
印刷版ISSN：0047-245X
出版年度：2008
卷号：39
期号：SUPPL
页码：154-168
出版社：Food Distribution Research Society
摘要：This study examines legislation that would grant growers termination damages if their contracts are terminated. Our model suggests that, with no contracting frictions, damages would not reduce ex ante efficiency as processors can contract around damages through contract restructuring. Growers would earn less under continuation but would be protected if terminated, although overall expected profits would be unaffected. However, when contracting friction exist, then efficiency losses can occur as processors would be constrained in restructuring contractual incentives to deal with moral hazard. Growers' expected profits would increase while processors' profit would decrease.
关键词：Contract law;Contract regulation;Damages;Incentives;Principal-agent