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  • 标题:USING BOTH SOCIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO REDUCE MORAL HAZARD
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Richter, Francisca G.-C. ; Diaz, Edgar F. Pebe ; Brorsen, B. Wade
  • 期刊名称:Journal of Food Distribution Research
  • 印刷版ISSN:0047-245X
  • 出版年度:2003
  • 期号:SUPPL
  • 出版社:Food Distribution Research Society
  • 摘要:Economists tend to focus on monetary incentives. In the model developed here, both sociological and economic incentives are used to diminish the apparent moral hazard problem existing in commodity grading. Training that promotes graders' response to sociological incentives is shown to increase expected benefits. The model suggests that this training be increased up to the point where the marginal benefit due to training equals its marginal cost. It may be more economical to influence the grader's behavior by creating cognitive dissonance through training and rules rather than by using economic incentives alone.
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