摘要:We analyze factors in states' decisions to switch their approaches to hazardous wasteliability policy from negligence standards to policies based on strict liability. Many, but notall, states have switched in recent years. We explain differences in the timing of states'adoption of strict liability into their "mini-superfund" programs using data on states' industrialactivities, environmental programs, wealth and education, and political orientation. We testimplications of a theoretical model in which states adopt the liability regime (strict versusnegligence-based liability) that they see as having greater net benefits. We test this model byestimating a probit equation of the presence or absence of strict liability in a state hazardouswaste cleanup program. We find that the likelihood of a state adopting strict liability ispositively associated with the number of large manufacturing plants located in that state, butnegatively associated with the number of large mining establishments. We also find thateducational attainment of residents, state government resources, effectiveness of other stateenvironmental programs, and political variables are significant determinants of the likelihoodof strict liability adoption. Our findings suggest states may view strict liability as better suitedto industrial waste sites than to mining pollution, that they may be partly motivated by a "deeppocket" mentality, or that they may anticipate engaging in "precaution targeting" (Tietenberg,1989). Non-adopters may have fewer resources available to confront environmentalproblems, may not wish to discourage business activity, or may have other programs in placewhich effectively substitute (at least for a time) for strict liability imposed on partiesresponsible for hazardous waste releases.