文章基本信息

标题：Unemployment and the "Labour-Management Conspiracy"
本地全文：下载
作者：Karp, Larry S. ; Paul, Thierry
期刊名称：Journal of Food Distribution Research
印刷版ISSN：0047-245X
出版年度：1998
期号：SUPPL
出版社：Food Distribution Research Society
摘要：We study a model in which management and a union bargain sequentially, first choosing a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and then choosing a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionized sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a "labour-management conspiracy".
关键词：unemployment;government subsidies;wage bargaining