摘要:In Kyoto in 1997, the US government agreed that between 2008 and 2012 it wouldlimit average annual emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to seven percent below 1990levels. As participants in the climate policy debate consider various means by which limits onUS GHG emissions might be undertaken in the wake of the Kyoto agreement, there isconsiderable interest but also some confusion about how a GHG trading program could beorganized and operated in practice. In this paper we address several aspects of policy designfor a US system, such as who and what is covered by regulation, the organization of thetrading system, how carbon permits are allocated, and how a system could be initiated andchanged over time. The paper synthesizes existing analyses and adds new insights concerninguncertainty, intertemporal consistency, market institutions, and interactions with the taxsystem. Our fundamental conclusion is that a domestic "cap-and-trade" system withhomogeneous permits applied to control flows of fossil fuels "upstream" in the energy system(along with selective inclusion of other gases and CO2"sinks"), with permits auctionedperiodically by the government, has the most appeal of different trading systems on efficiencyand distributional grounds, though it may suffer politically because of its close resemblance toa carbon tax. We identify auction mechanisms that appear to be feasible and efficient forcarbon permit allocation. We further argue that while the private sector should bear the"external" risk of changes in total permit availability as a consequence of modifications ininternational agreements, and that an auctioned upstream program provides more protectionagainst the "internal" risk of efficiency-reducing opportunism by government regulators thanother trading mechanisms.