文章基本信息

标题：STRATEGIC PATENT BREADTH FOR DRASTIC PRODUCT INNOVATIONS
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作者：Yiannaka, Amalia ; Fulton, Murray E.
期刊名称：Journal of Food Distribution Research
印刷版ISSN：0047-245X
出版年度：2001
期号：SUPPL
出版社：Food Distribution Research Society
摘要：The paper models the patenting behavior of the innovator/patent applicant who having invented a drastic product innovation decides on the optimal breadth of protection claimed. The patenting process is modeled as a sequential game of complete information. The patentee acts strategically and with foresight. He chooses the breadth of protection that induces the desired behavior by his opponents and he incorporates transaction costs that may have to be incurred to enforce his patent rights. Our results suggest that contrary to what is traditionally assumed it is not generally optimal for the patentee to claim the broadest protection possible.