文章基本信息

标题：Externalities, Decreasing Returns, and Common Ownership
本地全文：下载
作者：Simpson, R. David
期刊名称：Journal of Food Distribution Research
印刷版ISSN：0047-245X
出版年度：2001
期号：SUPPL
出版社：Food Distribution Research Society
摘要：Placing production units under common ownership is often suggested as a solution to the problem of externalities. This will not always be true when there are decreasing returns to scale. An atomistic industry could be more efficient than a monopoly in some instances. Even when the "optimal" industry configuration would involve a finite number of producers, no two may have appropriate incentives to combine. An omniscient and benign regulator can always assure a more efficient outcome than would result from the combination of private producers. Whether real-world regulators should be called upon, however, is less clear.
关键词：externalities;mergers;returns to scale;incentives