文章基本信息

标题：Further Thoughts on Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information
本地全文：下载
作者：Chung Yuan Fu ; Shirley J. Ho
期刊名称：Modern Economy
印刷版ISSN：2152-7245
电子版ISSN：2152-7261
出版年度：2013
卷号：4
期号：11
页码：696-705
DOI：10.4236/me.2013.411075
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：We study the informational impacts of multilateral voluntary export restraints (henceforth VERs) in an international trade model with differentiated products [1]. We first show that with competing mechanisms, the two firms’ lying intentions are strategic complements and will increase with the degree of product differentiation. Next, we show that each government will design their VERs menus to allow for only partial revelation. Contrary to the single intervention case [2], a separating equilibrium where each country’s domestic firm truthfully reveals its private information does not exist under multilateral policy interventions. Finally, we demonstrate that trade retaliation, when the two governments’ VERs are positively related, will happen when the government believes that its domestic firm is more likely to be inefficient.
关键词：Strategic Trade Policy; Voluntary Export Restraints; Partial Information Revelation