文章基本信息

标题：Cooperative games with size-truncated information
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作者：F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2014
卷号：34
期号：1
页码：188-200
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the so-called Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k,for any k,and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and onlyif the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, theintersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones.
关键词：Cooperative game; core; Weber set; marginal worth vectors