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文章基本信息

  • 标题:Solutions without dummy axiom for TU cooperative games
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez ; Ruben Juarez ; Luis Hernandez-Lamoneda
  • 期刊名称:Economics Bulletin
  • 电子版ISSN:1545-2921
  • 出版年度:2008
  • 卷号:3
  • 出版社:Economics Bulletin
  • 摘要:In this paper we study an expression for all additive, symmetric and efficient solutions, i.e., the set of axioms that traditionally are used to characterize the Shapley value except for the dummy axiom. Also, we obtain an expression for this kind of solutions by including the self duality axiom. These expressions allow us to give an alternative formula for the consensus value, the generalized consensus value and the solidarity solution. Furthermore, we introduce a new axiom called coalitional independence which replaces the symmetry axiom and use it to get similar results.
  • 关键词:axiomatic characterization
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