文章基本信息

标题：Predatory Bidding in Sequential Auctions
本地全文：下载
作者：Hikmet Gunay ; Xin Meng
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2007
卷号：4
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：The Turkish government wanted to sell two GSM (cell-phone) licenses in 2000 with sequential auctions. The winning bid in the first auction would be the reserve price for the second auction. This auction design gives incentives to ``predatory bidding." We show how a strategic firm will bid too high in the first auction hence, no other firms can pay the reserve price in the second auction. The winning firm will make up for the high-bid in terms of more profit due to less competition in the market. We show that the government could have sold the two licenses and raised more revenue in a correctly designed sequential auction.