文章基本信息

标题：A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
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作者：Wojciech Olszewski
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2007
卷号：3
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：Recently, there has been made a substantial progress in the analysis of repeated games with private monitoring. This progress began with introducing a new class of sequential equilibrium strategies, called belief-free equilibria, that can be analyzed using recursive techniques. The purpose of this paper is to explain the general method of constructing belief-free equilibria, and the limit (or bound) on the set of payoff vectors that can be achieved in these strategies in a way that should be easily accessible, even for those who do not pretend to be experts in repeated games.