文章基本信息

标题：Equilibrium incentives and accumulation of relational skills in a dynamic model of hold up
本地全文：下载
作者：Yutaka Suzuki
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2006
卷号：12
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：We construct a dynamic model of Holdup by applying a framework in capital accumulation games, and derive the Markov perfect equilibrium of the game. Firmsf specific investments for the current period affect the relational skill (state variable) in the next period. Therefore, firms decide their individual investment levels taking into account their impact on strategic interactions from the next period onwards. By considering hypothetically the impact of firmsf current investment decisions in the next period only, and by ignoring subsequent periods, a useful understanding about the relationship between two-period and infinite horizon formulations can be gained. We also compare the equilibrium incentives in both two-period and infinite horizon formulations, and investigate the equilibrium comparative statics and its implications.
关键词：A Dynamic Model of Hold up