文章基本信息

标题：Two-sided Matching, Who Marries Whom? And what Happens upon Divorce?
本地全文：下载
作者：Terence Tai-Leung Chong
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2006
卷号：4
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：Conventional two-sided matching game is a one-period game. In this note, we contribute to the existing literature by examining a multi-period two-sided matching problem allowing for the possibility of a divorce. We assume that the matching game is played repeatedly and the payoff matrix changes over time. It is shown that the rule of divorce will affect the equilibrium of a marriage game. An empirical implication of our result is that a country with a well-developed financial market will have a better marital outcome as compared to a less-developed country.