文章基本信息

标题：Incomplete Information, Renegotiation, and Breach of Contract
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作者：Jihong Lee
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2005
卷号：3
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：Once a contract has been agreed by two agents, the problem of renegotiating breach under two-sided asymmetric information on the agents' outside options is equivalent to the problem of bilateral trade with uncertain gains. Thus, the theorem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) implies the impossibility of efficient renegotiation. We also show that, assuming no renegotiation, the optimal breach mechanism in this setting corresponds to the expectation damage rule.
关键词：Contract Breach