文章基本信息

标题：A note on compatibility and entry in a circular model of product differentiation
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作者：Nicolas Jonard ; Eric Schenk
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2004
卷号：12
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：Consider an industry in which network goods are supplied by two horizontally differentiated firms facing the threat of a potential entrant. Firms' dilemma is between occupying the product space by selling very differentiated (incompatible) goods, and supplying compatible goods that offer higher utilities hence can be charged a higher price to consumers but are also closer substitutes. The compatibility-entry-price game is solved backward when firms and consumers are located on a circular product space. It turns out that strong externalities can favour entry, as merging the networks and accommodating entry can be preferred by the incumbents.
关键词：compatibility