文章基本信息

标题：Strategy-proofness of social choice functions and non-negative association property with continuous preferences
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作者：Yasuhito Tanaka
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2002
卷号：4
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：We consider the relation between strategy-proofness of resolute (single-valued) social choice functions and its property which we call Non-negative association property (NNAP) when individual preferences over infinite number of alternatives are continuous, and the set of alternatives is a metric space. NNAP is a weaker version of Strong positive association property (SPAP) of Muller and Satterthwaite(1977). Barbera and Peleg(1990) showed that strategy-proofness of resolute social choice functions implies Modified strong positive association property (MSPAP). But MSPAP is not equivalent to strategy-proofness. We shall show that strategy-proofness and NNAP are equivalent for resolute social choice functions with continuous preferences.
关键词：continuous preferences