期刊名称:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
印刷版ISSN:0027-8424
电子版ISSN:1091-6490
出版年度:2014
卷号:111
期号:13
页码:4820-4825
DOI:10.1073/pnas.1318372111
语种:English
出版社:The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
摘要:Several theories have emerged to explain how group cooperation (collective action) can arise and be maintained in the face of incentives to engage in free riding. Explanations focusing on reputational benefits and partner choice have particular promise for cases in which punishment is absent or insufficient to deter free riding. In indigenous communities of highland Peru, collective action is pervasive and provides critical benefits. Participation in collective action is unequal across households, but all households share its benefits. Importantly, investment in collective action involves considerable time, energy, and risk. Differential participation in collective action can convey information about qualities of fellow community members that are not easily observable otherwise, such as cooperative intent, knowledge, work ethic, skill, and/or physical vitality. Conveying such information may enhance access to adaptive support networks. Interview and observational data collected in a Peruvian highland community indicate that persons who contributed more to collective action had greater reputations as reliable, hard workers with regard to collective action and also were considered the most respected, influential, and generous people in the community. Additionally, household heads with greater reputations had more social support partners (measured as network indegree centrality), and households with larger support networks experienced fewer illness symptoms.
关键词:free-rider problem ; signaling ; social support ; evolution of cooperation