文章基本信息

标题：Competition for FDI and profit shifting: on the effects of subsidies and tax breaks
本地全文：下载
作者：Oscar Amerighi ; Giuseppe De Feo
期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Business School, University of Strathclyde
出版年度：2013
卷号：2013
出版社：University of Strathclyde
摘要：We investigate competition for FDI within a region when a foreign multinational rm can protably exploit dierences in statutory corporate tax rates by shifting taxable prots to lower-tax jurisdictions. In such framework we show that targeted tax competition may lead to higher welfare for the region as a whole than lump-sum subsidies when the dierence in statutory corporate tax rates and/or their average is high enough. Tax competition is also preferable from an eciency point of view (overall surplus) by changing the rm's investment decision when prot shifting motivations induce the rm to locate in the (before tax) least protable country.
关键词：Policy competition for FDI; Prot shifting; Tax discrimination