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标题：Non-Strategic Punishment when Monitoring is Costly: Experimental Evidence on Differences between Second and Third Party Behavior
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作者：Timo Goeschl ; Johannes Jarke
期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
出版年度：2013
卷号：2013
出版社：Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
摘要：This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third partiesin a cooperation experiment with endogenous information structures: Players are unin-formed whether the target player cooperated or defected at the cooperation stage, but candecide to resolve the information imperfection at non-negative cost at the punishmentstage. We examine how monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoringcosts, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about commonalities and differencesbetween second and third party behavior. We establish three effects of positive monitoringcosts relative to the zero-cost baseline and find that each one affects third parties differ-ently than second parties: A .direct punishment cost effect. (the supply of non-strategicpunishment decreases), a .blind punishment effect. (players punish without resolving theinformation imperfection) and a .diffusion effect. (defectors make up a smaller share ofthe punished and receive weaker punishment). The first effect affects third parties less,the other two more. As a result, third party punishment leads to increasingly weaker in-centives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. Inaddition, the differences between second and third parties suggest the presence of a .purerole effect.: Taking into account elicited beliefs and risk preferences, third parties punishdifferently from second parties, not just more weakly
关键词：monitoring; punishment; sanctions; information; cooperation