文章基本信息

标题：Monetary policy deliberations: committee size and voting rules
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作者：Vincent Maurin ; Jean-Pierre Vidal
期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2012
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：How large should a monetary policy committee be? Which voting rule should a monetary policy committee adopt? This paper builds on Condorcets jury threorem to analyse the relationships between com- mittee size and voting rules in a model where policy discussions are subject to a time constraint. It suggests that in large committees ma- jority voting is likely to enhance policy outcomes. Under unanimity (consensus) it is preferable to limit the size of the committee. Finally, supermajority voting rules are social contrivances that contribute to policy performance in a more uncertain environment, when initial pol- icy proposals are less likely to be correct, or when payo¤s are asym- metric.
关键词：Collective decision‐making; optimal committee sizing; deliberations; voting rules