文章基本信息

标题：The longer term refinancing operations of the ECB
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作者：Tobias Linzert ; Dieter Nautz ; Ulrich Bindseil 等
期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2004
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：This paper employs individual bidding data to analyze the empirical performance of the longer term refinancing operations (LTROs) of the European Central Bank (ECB). We investigate how banks’ bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables such as collateral costs, interest rate expectations, market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin, size, and experience. Panel regressions reveal that a bank’s bidding depends on bank characteristics. Yet, different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success. In contrast to the ECB’s main refinancing operations, we find evidence for the winner’s curse effect in LTROs. Our results indicate that LTROs do neither lead to market distortions nor to unfair auction outcomes.
关键词：Monetary Policy Instruments of the ECB; Auctions; Winner’s Curse;Panel Analysis of Bidding Behavior