文章基本信息

标题：Financial market integration and loan competition: when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?
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作者：Leo Kaas
期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2004
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：The paper analyzes how the removal of barriers to entry in banking a®ect loan competition, bank stability and economic welfare. We consider a model of spatial loan competition where a market that is served by less e±cient banks is opened to entry by banks that are more e±cient in screening borrowers. It is shown that there is typically too little entry and that market shares of entrant banks are too small relative to their socially optimal level. This is because e±cient banks internalize only the private but not the public bene¯ts of their better credit assessments. Only when bank failure is very likely or very costly, socially harmful entry can occur
关键词：Entry deregulation; Bank competition