文章基本信息

标题：Monetary policy and fears of financial instability
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作者：Vincent Brousseau ; Carsten Detken
期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2001
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：Exploiting a specific sunspot equilibrium in a standard forward-looking New Keynsian model, we present an example of a possible conflict between short-term price stability and financial stability. We find a conflict because the sunspot process consists of a self-fulfilling belief linking the stability of inflation to the smoothness of the interest rate path. A policy focusing only on a fixed-horizon inflation forecast neglects the potential effects of this belief on the variance of inflation. The nature of the conflict case is interpreted as evidence for the occasional relevance as well as the general tenuousness of the conflict case. The implementation of our example has led us, furthermore, to illustrate the lack of general applicability of the Bellman principle in dynamic programming for forward-looking models. Our result holds with respect to a more general (Nash-type) concept of optimality.
关键词：financial stability; price stability; optimal monetary policy; sunspot equilibria; Bellman;principle; time inconsistencyV