文章基本信息

标题：Learning, uncertainty and central bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions
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作者：Martin Ellison ; Natacha Valla
期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2000
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：In this paper we examine the optimal level of central bank activism in a standard model of monetary policy with uncertainty, learning and strategic interactions. We calibrate the model using G7 data and find that the presence of strategic interactions between the central bank and private agents creates an additional motivation for caution in optimal monetary policy. An active policy designed to help learning and reduce future uncertainty creates extra volatility in inflation expectations, which is detrimental to welfare.
关键词：activism; learning; monetary policy; strategic interactions; uncertainty