文章基本信息

标题：Fiscal Relations across Government Levels
本地全文：下载
作者：Isabelle Joumard ; Per Mathis Kongsrud
期刊名称：Economics Department Working Papers / OECD
印刷版ISSN：0259-4633
出版年度：2003
卷号：2003
DOI：10.1787/455513871742
出版社：Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
摘要：Despite its apparent advantages, devolution of fiscal responsibilities has not proceeded evenly over the past two decades. Decentralisation can strengthen the democratic process, allow governments to tailor the supply of public goods to local preferences and introduce some competition across jurisdictions, thus raising public sector efficiency. It can, however, entail efficiency losses, and make it difficult to implement redistributive policies and complicate macroeconomic management. On the spending side, local provision may fail to exploit economies of scale and internalise territorial spillovers -- a serious issue since few public goods are purely local by nature. On the revenue side, few tax bases can be exploited by subnational governments without risking making national objectives difficult to achieve and raising serious distributive concerns. This paper, which is largely based on country experiences in mitigating the potential drawbacks of decentralisation while obtaining ...
关键词：equalisation; tax assignment; fiscal federalism; fiscal co-ordination