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标题：An Ascending Multi-Item Auction with Financially Constrained Bidders
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作者：Gerard van der Laan ; Zaifu Yang
期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, University of York
出版年度：2011
卷号：2011
出版社：University of York
摘要：A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potential bidders. Every bidder knows his own values over the items and his own budget privately. Due to budget constraint, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values. In such a market, a Walrasian equilibrium typically fails to exist and furthermore no existing allocation mechanism can tackle this case. We propose the notion of an `equilibrium under allotment' to such markets and develop an ascending auction mechanism that always finds such an equilibrium assignment and corresponding price system in finitely many rounds. The auction can be viewed as an appropriate and proper generalization of the ascending auction of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor from settings without financial constraints to settings with financial constraints. We examine various properties of the auction and its outcome.