文章基本信息

标题：Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance
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作者：Jonathan de Quidt ; Thiemo Fetzer ; Maitreesh Ghatak 等
期刊名称：Japanese Studies Programme Papers
出版年度：2012
出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in micronance, we analyze borrower welfare under dierent market structures, considering a benevolent non-prot lender, a for-prot monopolist, and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the eects analyzed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implications for borrower welfare, while despite possible information frictions competition typically delivers similar borrower welfare to non-prot lending. In addition, for-prot lenders are less likely to use joint liability than non-prots.
关键词：micronance; market power; for-prot; social capital