文章基本信息

标题：Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure?
本地全文：下载
作者：Madhav S ; Aney ; Maitreesh Ghatak 等
期刊名称：Japanese Studies Programme Papers
出版年度：2011
出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to unobservability of talent endogenously creates a class structure that affects voting on institutional reform. In contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favour of surplus maximising institutional reform, we find that the preferences of these classes are often aligned in ways that creates a tension between surplus maximising and politically feasible institutional reforms.
关键词：occupational choice; adverse selection; property rights; asset;liquidation; political failure; market failure.