文章基本信息

标题：Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts
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作者：Luca Anderlini ; Leonardo Felli
期刊名称：Japanese Studies Programme Papers
出版年度：2000
卷号：1
出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：This paper explores the link between boundedly rational behaviour and incomplete contracts. The bounded rationality of the agents in our world is embodied in a constraint that the contracts they write must be algorithmic in nature. We start with a definition of contract incompleteness that seems both appealing and widely applicable. Our first task is then to show that, by itself, the algorithmic nature of contracts is not enough to generate genuinely incomplete contracts in equilibrium. As in Anderlini and Felli (1994), we call this the Approximation Result. We then consider contractual situations in which the complexity costs of a contract are explicitly taken into accoaunt. We consider a broad (axiomatically defined) class of complexity measures and in this framework we show that incomplete contracts obtain in equilibrium. We also extensively discuss some recent literature directly related to the results reported here
关键词：Incomplete contracts; bounded rationality; complexity costs