文章基本信息

标题：Evidence-free Policy: The Case of the National Injury Insurance Scheme
本地全文：下载
作者：Mark Harrison
期刊名称：Agenda
印刷版ISSN：1322-1833
电子版ISSN：1447-4735
出版年度：2013
卷号：20
期号：1
出版社：Australian National University
摘要：The Productivity Commission report ‘Disability Care and Support’ recommends tort liability be replaced by a compulsory, government-run, no-fault scheme. But theory and evidence indicate moving to a no-fault scheme will increase the accident rate. Even a move from non-risk-rated third-party insurance to non-risk-rated first-party insurance reduces incentives for care. A no-fault scheme is not superior to current policies; genuine reform will need to be informed by law and economics literature.