文章基本信息

标题：Optimal Managerial Contracts with Self-Esteem Concerns When Managers Can Hedge
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作者：Chongwoo Choe ; Donald Lien ; Chia-Feng Yu 等
期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, Monash University
出版年度：2013
卷号：1
出版社：Monash University
摘要：We study an optimal contracting problem when the manager has self-esteem concerns and access to a hedging market. We show that the manager's equilibrium hedging position increases when he is more risk-averse, more uncertain about his own ability, or has stronger self-esteem concerns. Each element of managerial hedging and self-esteem concerns added to an otherwise standard agency model increases the equilibrium pay-performance sensitivity. The agency cost increases as the manager's self-esteem concerns become stronger, but the manager's access to hedging opportunities itself does not change the agency cost. We also provide conditions for the positive relationship between risk and incentives.
关键词：Managerial Hedging; Executive Compensation; Self-Esteem.