文章基本信息

标题：Reward Self-Reporting to Deter Corruption: An Experiment on Mitigating Collusive Bribery
本地全文：下载
作者：Kevin Wu ; Klaus Abbink
期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, Monash University
出版年度：2013
卷号：1
出版社：Monash University
摘要：This paper investigates the effectiveness of offering rewards for self reports as a means of combating collusive bribery. Rewarding self reporting theoretically sows distrust between parties tempted to exchange bribes and may reduce bribery even where authorities are otherwise ineffective in uncovering corruption. Our results indicate that offering rewards is weakly effective in reducing collusive bribery where parties expect to engage with one another in future and is a potent deterrent when parties do not expect to encounter one another again. Rewarding self reporting is thus likely to be highly effective in reducing bribery in the field but only for one off interactions.
关键词：Collusive bribery; experiment; asymmetric reporting; Reward; Bonus Leniency