期刊名称:Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, Monash University
出版年度:2013
卷号:1
出版社:Monash University
摘要:We study trader agent intermediated lending (TRAIL), a new version of microfinance where local intermediaries (lenders) are appointed as agents to recommend borrowers for individual liability loans designed to allow the financing of agricultural operations. The scheme involves no peer monitoring, group meetings or savings requirements. In a randomized evaluation conducted in West Bengal, India, TRAIL loans have higher take-up rates and higher repayment rates than traditional group-based joint liability loans. This can be explained by a model of segmented informal credit markets with adverse selection, in which repayment-based commissions deter collusion and motivate agents to recommend low-risk borrowers
关键词:Microfinance; Agent Based Lending; Group Lending; Selection; Takeup;Repayment