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标题：Repayment and Exclusion in a Microfinance Experiment
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作者：Jean-Marie Baland ; Lata Gangadharan ; Pushkar Maitra 等
期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, Monash University
出版年度：2013
卷号：1
出版社：Monash University
摘要：Microfinance groups often engage in a variety of collective activities not directly related to credit. Groups can sanction members who default on their loans by excluding them from these activities. Our experiment is designed to explore the effectiveness of such sanctions in improving repayment incentives. Groups of 10 members are provided with joint-liability loans for a specific investment project. If groups repay their loans, contributing members have the option of excluding other members and those that remain play a public goods game. By varying loan sizes across groups and allowing for heterogeneous gains from the public good within groups, we identify the role of incentives in repayment decisions. In line with theoretical predictions, groups with the largest repayment burdens have the highest default rates and within groups, individual decisions to contribute to loan repayment depend on gains from the public good game
关键词：Microfinance; Joint Liability; Social Exclusion; Public Good; Heterogeneous Productivity;Laboratory Experiments.