文章基本信息

标题：Note on Stable Mergers in a Market with Asymmetric Substitutability
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作者：Takayuki Watanabe ; Nobuo Matsubayashi
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2013
卷号：33
期号：3
页码：2024-2033
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：This paper studies the stability of mergers between firms in a Cournot market. Unlike most existing works, we consider a demand structure where the substitutability between firms is asymmetric. We specifically focus on the stability of the grand coalition by analyzing the core allocation. The main result of our analysis shows that the grand coalition becomes stable, as the market is more asymmetric in terms of substitutability.
关键词：Core; Horizontal merger; Cournot oligopoly; Differentiation; Grand coalition