文章基本信息

标题：Bargaining with uncertain value distributions
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作者：Huan Xie
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2013
卷号：33
期号：2
页码：1047-1066
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：This paper studies a bargaining model in which the seller is uncertain about which distribution the buyer's values are drawn from. The distribution of the buyer's values is fixed across periods, while the buyer's values are drawn independently from the distribution each period. In the classical model of repeated bargaining where the buyer's value is drawn from a commonly known distribution and fixed across periods, the high-value buyer has a strong incentive to conceal his value, and the seller loses most of her bargaining power. An important question is whether adding a layer of uncertainty makes the high-value buyer more willing to accept high-price offers and improves the seller's revenue. We find this to be the case as long as the seller's ex ante beliefs are sufficiently optimistic.
关键词：Repeated Bargaining; Uncertain Value Distributions; Revenue Comparison; Learning