文章基本信息

标题：Radner's Theorem on Teams and Games with a Continuum of Players
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作者：Takashi Ui ; Yasunori Yoshizawa
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2013
卷号：33
期号：1
页码：72-77
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：This note considers Bayesian games with a continuum of players, symmetric quadratic payoff functions, and normally distributed signals. It shows that a recent result on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is implied by a classical theorem on teams by Radner (1962, Ann. Math. Stat. 33).
关键词：unique linear equilibrium; Bayesian potential game; team.